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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE EC~UITABLE LIFE ASSUR- 1 
AXCE S 0 C I ET Y OF THE l 
lTNITED STATES, a corporation, 
Appellee, ~· 
vs. I 
' Case No. 
ALYIN R. \VALKENHORST and 10849 
.T OYCE WALKENHORST, his 
wife, RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, \ 
INC.. a corporation; UTAH INDUS-
TRIAL COl\lMISSION and UTAH ,1 
STATE TAX COl\lMISSION, 
Appellants . .I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This is an action to foreclose a real estate note 
and mortgage on a family dwelling located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. The mortgagee, engaging primarily in 
the life insurance business, coupled with their real estate 
1 
note the collection of joint life insurance payments by 
mortgagors who counterclaimed, alleging the mort a; 
1 . . 1 . f h g l:\t oan was m v10 ahon o C apter 27, Utah Code Anno. 
tated, "Unfair of Deceptive Acts and Practices." 
namely: Title 31-27-2 (1), 14 and 15. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case came on for pretrial before the Honor-
able Leonard ,V. Elton, who granted mortgagee's mo-
tion for summary judgment on its real estate note and 
mortgage and dismissed mortgagor's counterclaim. The 
court did permit mortgagors to amend their pleadings 
to include the defense of usury. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mortgagors, defendants, and appellants seek re· 
versal of the judgment of the lower court whereby their 
counterclaim, as amended, was dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At pretrial it was stipulated between counsel for 
the respective parties, that the promissory note and real 
property mortgage which plaintiff, Equitable Life 
Assurance Society of the United States (hereafter 
called "A ppellee") was seeking to foreclose was exe-
cuted by Alvin R. Walkenhorst and Joyce 'Valken· 
horst, his wife, (hereafter called "Appellants") in the 
2 
·:·i1mplaint was due and owing by appellants provided 
t iia t a ppellec was entitled to foreclose its note and 
mortgage. 
A ppellee 's real estate mortgage note, mortgage, 
atid assignment of policy as collateral security were in-
tr(\duced by its counsel and they were marked as plain-
tiff"'i Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Appellant intro-
dtll'cd the C niform Real Estate Contract, under which 
'he>- originally purchased their home, a Joint Ordinary 
L;fc pulicy, a letter dated October 15, 1965, and a letter 
dated October 25, 1965; all of these documents were 
t:1rn1'ihed the court as part of a Memorandum and 
,,·crc marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
\ H. 8:!-107). 
Appellants Alvin R. 'Valkenhorst and Joyce 
\\'alkenhorst, his wife, on the 18th day of July, 1963, 
executed and delivered to appellee their promissory 
note and mortgage in the amount of $11,600.00. The 
note provided for interest at the rate of 6% per annum 
and for 300 successive payments of $108.58, which in-
cluded interest at the aforesaid rate (P. Ex. 1). As 
security for said note, defendants mortgaged (P. Ex. 
:! \ a bome in Salt Lake County which they had pur-
chased on the 21st day of March, 1953, for the amount 
of $H,OOO.OO. (R. 82-83). 
On the 29th day of June, 1963, appellants made 
an application to appellee for a joint life policy of 
msurance in the amount of $11,600.00, wherein each 
apptllant named the other appellant as beneficiary in 
3 
the event of either appellant's death and appelle 
. ' e Would 
receive the proceeds of the joint policy to discha rge 1() 
note and mortgage. On September l 1963 Eqt ·t 1,· . . . ' • II a Ju 
issued a 1omt policy (See Ex. 2) in the face a11 lOUIJ; 
of $11,600.00 which provided for a monthly preIUJ· . 
• Ull1 
m the amount of $34.34. 
Provided appellants paid their note pursuant tn 
its terms, towit: 300 payments of $108.58 each, they 
would have paid over the twenty-five year period tl;r 
total sum of $32,57 4.58. Of the $108.58 payment eacli 
month, appellee credited the joint life policy with 
$34.34 for a total of $10,300.00. 
Appellants' first monthly payment of $108 .. 58 
pursuant to the terms of the mortgage note was due 
September, 1963, and appellants paid it timely; they 
followed with monthly payments thereafter for 24 suc-
cessive months. Thus, appellants made a total of 2~ 
monthly installments up until the time that appellee 
claims the default set forth in its complaint. 
Appellants, prior to the time they executed the 
note and mortgage and delivered them to appellee, 
were told by agents of appellee that the insurance they 
were purchasing on their lives would: (a) cost them 
nothing, for the dividends the policy would earn would 
exceed the premiums over the twenty-fiveyear period of 
the note and mortgage; (b) that in the event that ap-
pellants, after the first year, should miss a payment on 
the promissory note, that appellee would automatic-
ally borrow on appellants' joint life policy, and that 
4 
,tint.~ borrowed Ly appellee, appellants could repay 
;ti their eo11Yenience, incurring a nominal interest charge; 
aiid ( c) that appellants could not obtain a home mort-
g:iµ;e from appellee unless appellants agreed in advance 
1u purehase a joint life policy. (R. 76). Appellants 
;Tlied upo11 the aforesaid material representations by 
:,~ent.'> of appellee. 
"\ppellants' default under the terms and conditions 
<'I their uote and mortgage, occurred, if at all, on the 
-.:wl day nf October, 1965, the thirty-first day after 
d<·t'endants failed to remit a monthly payment. In 
.1dditiotL appellee claimed there were some unpaid 
:wnued taxes and special assessments. However, ap-
pellants, but for the filing of this action, were ready, 
\Y;llmg and able to satisfy these arrearages. 
Appellants, through their attorney, attempted to 
remedy any default by remitting two monthly pay-
ments, to wit: $218.45 (see Ex. 3) which was refused 
on October 29, 1965, unless certain conditions precedent 
were met (see Ex. 4, R. 103-106). 
Appellee's note and mortgage provides for a thirty-
day grace period from the due date of each monthly 
installment. Exhibit 2, the joint policy, issued August 
:n, 1964, had accumulated a cash or loan value on 
October 2, 1965, the date of the alleged default, in the 
amount of $150.00 (see page 18 of Exhibit 2, R. 95). 
Had appellee kept its promise to appellants to borrow 
fron1 the joint life policy, the alleged default by appel-
ia11ts would have been automatically cured. 
5 
On October 27, 1965, appellee refused to accet 
a tendered check for the arrearage due, but provisional~ 
would permit appellants to pay their arrearage on th
1 
note. a~d ~ort~age provided they continued keepin~ 
the Jomt life msurance policy in force; pay specia 
assessments, taxes, if any, legal fees, court costs, an:~ 
further furnish a letter of estoppel for the protectio:i 
of appellee. (R. 195, 106). 
In fact, had appellee transferred the amount ap 
pellants had accumulated under the joint policy, thert 
would have been no default at all on the part of apppJ. 
lants, for on the 2nd day of October, 1965, defendant· 
had a cash or loan value under the joint policy of m 
surance of $150.00 (see page 10 of Exhibit 2). The 
tender by counsel for defendants on October 15, 1965. 
would have been tantamount to payment in advance. 
On the 8th day of December, 1966, this matter 
came on for pretrial, and the appellee moved the Court 
for a summary judgment (R. 49) and for a judgment 
dismissing the counterclaim as contained in the answer 
of the appellants. Attorney for the appellants prepared 
and filed a Memorandum of Authorities pursuant to 
leave of Court, and on January 27, 1967, the court 
having heard the arguments of counsel as to the proper 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be entered 
herein, and over the objection of appellee's attorney, 
granted the motion for leave to amend the answer here· 





THE THI.AL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
l\l~ ~\PPELLEE'S l\IOTION FOR A SUl\1-
:\lAHY .JCDG.MENT . 
The application of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
1 'i" il Procedure presupposes the following: 
1. The party against whom the motion is made 
is entitled to all the favorable inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from the facts, a1'd 
if when so viewed reasonable men might reach 
different conclusions, the motion should be de-
nied, Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm 
King Corp., 303 F.2d 425 (6 Cir. 1962). 
2. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine 
issue regarding material facts must be resolved 
against the party moving from summary judg-
ment. Toebleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line 
Co .. 130 F.2d 1016 (3 Cir. 1942). 
3. 'Vhere conflicting inferences may be drawn 
from the facts presented, summary judgment 
may not be granted. Holden v. United States, 
186 F.Supp. 76 (D.C.N.Y. 1960). 
Appellants set forth in their Memorandum of 
Authorities the facts which they alleged they would 
proYe at a trial. These facts if established would place 
into issue whether or not appellee, in selling its insur-
ance, had made certain prohibited representations, and 
further, failed to keep their oral representation in con-
nection with the applications of insurance reserves to be 
7 
applied on loan payments. Appellees would n 
ece,. 
sarily have to challenge the foregoing facts and reso\r. 
the issues raised in its favor; otherwise, it would foll()\: 
that it had breached its own oral contract with apptl-
lants and sought their foreclosure prematurely. 
POINT II 
IT \\T AS UNLA 'VFUL AND IN YI OLA. 
TI ON OF THE INSURANCE CODE OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH FOR APPEL~EE TO TH. 
TOGETHER, AS IT DID, THE REAL ES-
TATE LOAN PREDICATED UPON APPEL-
LANT'S PURCHASE OF ITS INSURANCE. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Chapter 27, provides 
as follows: 
"31-27-2. CERTAIN CONTRACTS, UN-
DERSTANDINGS OR COMBINATIONS 
FORBIDDEN - ENFORCEMENT OF' 
COMMISSIONER'S ORDERS. - (I) No 
person shall either within or outside of this state 
enter into any contract, understanding, or com-
bination with any other person to do jointly or 
severally any act or engage in any practice for 
the purpose of 
" ( c) establishing or perpetuating any con· 
dition in this state detrimental to free compe· 
tion in the business of insurance or injurious 
to the insuring public. 
"31-27-14. INDUCEMENTS, UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION, REBATES PRO· 
8 
IIlBlTED. - (1) (a) No insurer or any em-
plo~·ee thereof, and no agent, broker, or so.licitor 
!-.hall pay. allow or give or offer to pay, allow to 
1 or, give, directly or indirectly, as an induce-
ment to insurance, or after insurance has been 
etfectecl, any rebate, discount, abatement, credit 
or reduction of the premium named in a policy 
of insurance, or any special favor or advantage 
i11 the diYidends or other benefits to accrue there-
011_ or any valuable consideration or inducement 
whateYer, not specified in the policy, except to 
the extent provided for in an applicable filing 
which is in effect as provided in chapter 18 of 
this code. 
'"Bl-27-15. OFFERING SECURITIES, 
CONTRACTS, GOODS, l\lERCHANDISE 
OR SERYICES AS INDUCEl\ilENTS. -
No insurer, agent, broker, solicitor, or any other 
person, shall, as an inducement to the purchase 
of an insurance or annuity contract, or in con-
nection with any insurance transaction, provide 
in any policy for, or offer, or sell, buy, or offer 
or promise to buy or give, or promise, or allow, 
in any manner whatsoever: 
" ( 2) Any special advisory board contract, 
OR OTHER CONTRACT, agreement, or 
understanding of any kind, offering, provid-
ing for, or promising any profits or special 
returns or special dividends, or 
" ( 3) Any prizes, goods, wares, or merchan-
dise of an aggregate value in excess of one 
dollar, or ... " (Emphasis added). 
This court has not had occasion to interpret the 
ah<l\·e statutes as they may apply to appellants' theory 
of this case, however, the language appears to be clear 
9 
and not amenable to any other interpretation th 
1 · 1 · · . . an thai w uc 1 is ordmanly attributed to the language t f se ort] 
a hove as quoted. 
In connection with Section 31-27-1 (c) the off · ' er1nlr 
of .rea~ estate loans to residents of Utah by appelle~ 
which is known to be one of the largest insurance com. 
panies in the world with insurance in force and mil!ioni 
of dollars of assets, is clearly an attempt to establi~n 
or perpetuate a condition which is detrimental to fret 
competition of insurance in this state, and detrimental 
to the insuring public. 
31-27-15 (a) expressly prohibits the giving by 
appellee of any such special favor or advantage in c011• 
nection with the sale of its insurance. 
Appellee's agreement to lend $11,600.00 payable 
over a 25-year period at 6% annual interest is clearly 
a special favor or advantage or valuable consideration 
or inducement to gain insurance business through the 
use of its multi-million dollar treasury. 
31-27-14 (2) and (3) prohibits an insurer to offer 
promises, give or allow in any manner whatsoever, any 
OTHER CONTRACT, AGREEMENT OR U~· 
DERST ANDING OF ANY KIND PROVIDING 
FOR OR PROMISING ANY PROFITS OR 
SPECIAL RETURNS. The lending of $11,600.00 
to finance defendants' home in connection with the sale 
of insurance, as was done in this case is prohibited, and 
such contracts are void. 
10 
POINT III 
APPELLEE'S INCLUSION OF INSUR-
.\~CE PHE~IIE~IS IN ITS PROMISSORY 
\'UTE EXECCTED AND DELIVERED BY 
.\PPELLANTS IN CONNECTION \VITH 
THE FINANCING OF THEIR HOME IS UN-
L\\YFFL. 
It is clear that appellee is prohibited from soliciting 
i1,,,urance wherein it offers as an inducement a mortgage 
it1a11. 1 t follows, that as a legal consequence of appellee's 
,.,Jllertiug :l4 payments of $34.34 each, it must credit 
foi.., amount as advance payments on its mortgage loan, 
otherwise, appellee's note and mortgage would be in 
,·iolation of Utah usury laws, namely, Section 15-1-2, 
wherein it provides that maximum interest for the loan 
of money, goods, things in action, shall not exceed 10% 
per annum. 
Thus, at the time of the alleged default by de-
fendants, they had, in fact, prepaid $824.16 and were 
not in default. If the aforesaid payments are not 
credited as advance payments on the note and mort-
gage, then the legal conclusion is that appellee has 
embarked upon a usurious contract with appellants and 
pursuant to Section 15-1-17, UCA, all interest is for-
feited and defendants are entitled to treble such pay-
ments as unlawful interest payments, and be awarded 
their costs and attorney fees. See National vs. Bayou 
Country Club, 16 Utah 2nd 417, and 403 Pac. 2nd 26. 
11 
POINT IV 
ACTS AND CONTRACTS IN VIOLATIOx 
OF SECTIONS 31-27-2 (1), 31-27-14 (1) (a) A~L 
31-27-15, UCA, ARE PROHIBITED AND REX. 
DER SUCH ACTS AND CONTRACTS rorn 
AB INITIO. 
A ppellee' s promissory note and mortgage are \'(\i<l 
ab initio for they were executed as part of the insuranct 
contract which is void as a matter of law. The note an
1
; 
mortgage, which were marked and admitted at pretrial, 
provide for the payment of insurance premiums a) 
well as appellee's money loaned and cannot be sep~1-
rated. 
This court announced long ago in Baker v. Latse.1 
60 Utah 38, 206 P. 553: 
"It is the generally accepted doctrine of this 
country that every contract in violation of law 
is void. It is equally true that our courts will 
not lend their aid to the enforcement of nor 
permit a recovery of coi_npe~sati?n u_nder, con-
tract made and entered mto m v10lation of law 
prohibiting them or declaring them to be un-
lawful." 
Appellee has no right to foreclose its mortgage and 
note in this matter. In fact, they have no security and 
their action should be limited to money had and received 
by appellants. 
POINT V 
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY 'VAS 
12 
\OT HE(;ISTEHED AND DELIYERED TO 
\PPELLAXTS UXTIL AFTER SEPTE:\IBER 
I rnn:3. IIEXCE APPELLANTS ARE NOT 
BUl.XD BY THE TER~IS OF THEIR \VRIT-
TEX i\SSll;X~lEXT AND EQUITABLE IS 
BOI'XU BY THEIR AGENT'S REPRESEN-
'L\TlONS. 
Appellants were required to assign as collateral 
Jor tht·tr mortgage loan their joint life policy. See 
plaintiff\, Ex. 3 attached hereto and made a part hereof 
l:y rei'erern:e. The joint life policy, Exhibit 2, shows on 
ih face that it was registered September I, 1963. 
:\ ppellants could not assign their policy until 
E(1uitable had processed their application and issued 
a poliey. The assignment was executed contempora-
11eonsJy with the note and mortgage. 
The representations by appellee's agent that ap-
pellee would automatically borrow on the policy in the 
event of appellants' missing a payment, is controlling, 
notwithstanding appellee's position that the written 
assignment controls the rights between the parties for 
the following reasons: 
( 1) The assignment is void as a matter of law for 
reasons set forth in Point III, and 
( 2) Appellants could not assign a policy of in-
surance not in being. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted there are substantiat 
unresolved disputed questions of material facts \ihitii 
require a trial. However, on the face of the documenh 
presented by appellee, it would appear proper anrl 
reasonable for this court to hold as a matter of law that 
the note, mortgage, assignment of insurance policy. 
and the joint life policy itself are all void and require 
appellee to amend its complaint for an action based 
upon money had and received. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 1 
425 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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